H5N1

Six unlearned lessons of the pandemic

The Tyee has published my article Six Unlearned Lessons of the Pandemic. Excerpt:

6. We’ll never go back to the ‘before times’  

The neoliberal world order established since the 1980s has been brutally shaken since New Year’s Eve 2019, exposing political failures ranging from worsening climate change to the migration crisis and systemic racism. Yet governments behave as if the pandemic scarcely exists. They play familiar Cold War games: Russia threatens Ukraine, China bullies its critics, the U.S. pretends it’s the leader of something called the “free world.”  

It’s understandable to yearn for a world without a pandemic. But the “before times” got us into this mess. If we did go back to before-times economies and social relations, we would soon face still more pandemics and social conflicts. Omicron’s Here.

As the pandemic continues, with occasional guest appearances by climate disasters like last summer’s heat dome and November’s floods, many of the world’s leading nations (and leaders) are hollowed-out remnants of what they once were. Internally divided, they pretend it’s business as usual. But they seem terrified of their own people and unable to define and carry out a consistent pandemic policy.  

So, having learned nothing from the pandemic, they continue as they began — unless and until we elect new governments that really have learned from the past two years.

Static socio-ecological COVID-19 vulnerability index and vaccine hesitancy index for England

Via The Lancet Regional Health: Static Socio-Ecological COVID-19 Vulnerability Index and Vaccine Hesitancy Index for England. The summary:

Background  

Population characteristics can be used to infer vulnerability of communities to COVID-19, or to the likelihood of high levels of vaccine hesitancy. Communities harder hit by the virus, or at risk of being so, stand to benefit from greater resource allocation than their population size alone would suggest. This study reports a simple but efficacious method of ranking small areas of England by relative characteristics that are linked with COVID-19 vulnerability and vaccine hesitancy.  

Methods  

Publicly available data on a range of characteristics previously linked with either poor COVID-19 outcomes or vaccine hesitancy were collated for all Middle Super Output Areas of England (MSOA, n=6790, excluding Isles of Scilly), scaled and combined into two numeric indices. Multivariable linear regression was used to build a parsimonious model of vulnerability (static socio-ecological vulnerability index, SEVI) in 60% of MSOAs, and retained variables were used to construct two simple indices. Assuming a monotonic relationship between indices and outcomes, Spearman correlation coefficients were calculated between the SEVI and cumulative COVID-19 case rates at MSOA level in the remaining 40% of MSOAs over periods both during and out with national lockdowns. Similarly, a novel vaccine hesitancy index (VHI) was constructed using population characteristics aligned with factors identified by an Office for National Statistics (ONS) survey analysis. The relationship between the VHI and vaccine coverage in people aged 12+years (as of 2021-06-24) was determined using Spearman correlation. The indices were split into quintiles, and MSOAs within the highest vulnerability and vaccine hesitancy quintiles were mapped.  

Findings  

The SEVI showed a moderate to strong relationship with case rates in the validation dataset across the whole study period, and for every intervening period studied except early in the pandemic when testing was highly selective. The SEVI was more strongly correlated with case rates than any of its domains (rs 0·59 95% CI 0.57-0.62) and outperformed an existing MSOA-level vulnerability index. The VHI was significantly negatively correlated with COVID-19 vaccine coverage in the validation data at the time of writing (rs -0·43 95% CI -0·46 to -0·41). London had the largest number and proportion of MSOAs in quintile 5 (most vulnerable/hesitant) of SEVI and VHI concurrently.  

Interpretation  

The indices presented offer an efficacious way of identifying geographical disparities in COVID-19 risk, thus helping focus resources according to need.

Our long night of the virus

The Tyee has published my long review of four important new books about the pandemic: Our Long Night of the Virus. Excerpt:

The pandemic and climate change, combined, have triggered what [Adam] Tooze calls a “great acceleration,” when events outrun earlier predictions and solutions. We will therefore have to improvise new solutions — or, like the populists, stick to a very old non-solution of anti-science white supremacy in the hope of returning to the “before times.” 

The imperial infection  

Rupa Marya, an American physician of Indian descent, and Raj Patel, a British academic, journalist and author, offer a solution from the before times in their book Inflamed: Deep Medicine and the Anatomy of Injustice. They argue that this pandemic, like countless disease outbreaks before it, is a consequence not just of a virus but of an imperialist world order that triggered disease and then built a medical system to serve the rulers, not the victims.  

This is not some radical Marxist spin, but established medical history. In the early 19th century, British development turned wetlands into farmlands in what is now Bangladesh, and brought a marine bacterium called Vibrio cholera into human guts. Cholera rapidly migrated on trade routes to London and beyond.  

In London, Dr. John Snow founded modern epidemiology by spotting the precise well that was infecting the neighbourhood. His medical colleagues dismissed his idea, but eventually Britain rebuilt its water supply system and greatly improved its workers’ health. Travellers from India were screened at Suez to try to stop further outbreaks from reaching Europe. But like Omicron, cholera was all over the planet by the time it was recognized.  

Meanwhile, cholera was left to ravage India itself, and we are now in the seventh cholera pandemic, which began in Indonesia in 1961 and most recently exploded in Haiti in 2010.  

Marya and Patel are by far the most radical analysts of this pandemic. They have no interest in blaming Donald Trump or the CDC; they are just the agents of a system created to serve the interests of 19th century empires, and which now protects the white heirs of those empires while ignoring the “essential” workers who serve those heirs.  

The authors have strong confirmation from others like Alex de Waal, whose recent book shows how Louis Pasteur’s germ theory defeated the German scientist-politician Rudolf Virchow, who had long argued for social and economic inequality as the root of disease outbreaks. Pasteur had blamed individual microbes, which could be isolated, fought and defeated like rebellious tribesmen in some remote colony. We still fall back on war metaphors to describe our response to the pandemic.

A new study ties lifespans to wealth gaps in Greater Vancouver

The Tyee has published my latest article: A New Study Ties Lifespans to Wealth Gaps in Greater Vancouver. Excerpt:

We like to think of Greater Vancouver as one of the best places to live in Canada, if not in the world. Yes, it is — especially for those of us living in the most affluent neighbourhoods. Those in the poorest neighbourhoods, however, are dying younger than their rich neighbours, sometimes by many years. And the gap between them was getting wider even before the opioid-overdose crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic became twin health emergencies. 

That’s an easy conclusion to draw from a recent study published in the journal Health & Place. Of course it’s more complicated than that, but it still seems paradoxical that a region as prosperous as Greater Vancouver should see some people die years younger than others living just a few kilometres away.  

The study involved UBC researchers working with the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington and with Imperial College, London. Its ambitious goal was to track life expectancy and major causes of deaths in Greater Vancouver over a quarter-century, from 1990 to 2016. Moreover, they broke the numbers down to the census-tract-level — in effect, neighbourhood by neighbourhood. Overall, the study offers an invaluable portrait of our collective health before the pandemic.  

In some ways, it’s a very flattering portrait. Even the poorest males, in the tenth percentile, had a median life expectancy in 2016 of 77.6; that is, half died before that age and half later. For tenth-percentile females, median life expectancy was 82.5.  

But in the 95th percentile, the richest five per cent of our population, median male life expectancy was 87.1. For females in the 90th percentile, it was 90.8. The poor were paying with almost a decade of their lives for the privilege of living here. 

 The study makes a striking observation: “Between 1991 and 2016, there was a downward trend in the LE [life expectancy] gap, whereby the lowest gap was observed in 2001 (6.9 years for females and 7.9 for males), but this reversed and increased by 1.4-1.6 years between 2001 and 2016.” By a wild coincidence, 2001 was the year the BC Liberals won a huge majority over the NDP and ran the province under Gordon Campbell and then Christy Clark until 2017.  

British researchers noticed a very similar effect during Margaret Thatcher’s years in power: Around 1980, British and Japanese life expectancy were about the same, but then, as the U.K. income gap widened, British lives grew shorter. In Japan, with a much narrower income gap, life expectancy rose to among the highest on the planet.  

What we’re dying of  

And what have Greater Vancouver residents been dying of? Between 1990 and 2016, deaths from cardiovascular diseases, neoplasms (cancers) and unintentional injuries dropped sharply. Clearly, we’ve been exercising more, smoking less, and taking care of ourselves, at least up to a point.  

But we’ve also seen a 10 per cent increase in neurological disorders, a catch-all term that can include everything from Alzheimer’s to eating disorders to meningitis. Other noncommunicable diseases like diabetes mellitus and kidney disease rose by almost four per cent.  

And while the richest of us had little to fear from infectious diseases in 1991, the poorest were already contending with (and dying from) HIV-AIDS and sexually transmitted infections at 12 times the rate as the richest. The poorest faced seven times the rate of maternal and neonatal disorders. They died of neoplasms at over four times the rate of the richest.

Life expectancy and risk of death in 6791 communities in England from 2002 to 2019

Via The Lancet Public Health: Life expectancy and risk of death in 6791 communities in England from 2002 to 2019: high-resolution spatiotemporal analysis of civil registration data. The summary:

Background  

High-resolution data for how mortality and longevity have changed in England, UK are scarce. We aimed to estimate trends from 2002 to 2019 in life expectancy and probabilities of death at different ages for all 6791 middle-layer super output areas (MSOAs) in England.  

Methods  

We performed a high-resolution spatiotemporal analysis of civil registration data from the UK Small Area Health Statistics Unit research database using de-identified data for all deaths in England from 2002 to 2019, with information on age, sex, and MSOA of residence, and population counts by age, sex, and MSOA. We used a Bayesian hierarchical model to obtain estimates of age-specific death rates by sharing information across age groups, MSOAs, and years. We used life table methods to calculate life expectancy at birth and probabilities of death in different ages by sex and MSOA.  

Findings  

In 2002–06 and 2006–10, all but a few (0–1%) MSOAs had a life expectancy increase for female and male sexes. In 2010–14, female life expectancy decreased in 351 (5·2%) of 6791 MSOAs. By 2014–19, the number of MSOAs with declining life expectancy was 1270 (18·7%) for women and 784 (11·5%) for men. 

The life expectancy increase from 2002 to 2019 was smaller in MSOAs where life expectancy had been lower in 2002 (mostly northern urban MSOAs), and larger in MSOAs where life expectancy had been higher in 2002 (mostly MSOAs in and around London). As a result of these trends, the gap between the first and 99th percentiles of MSOA life expectancy for women increased from 10·7 years (95% credible interval 10·4–10·9) in 2002 to reach 14·2 years (13·9–14·5) in 2019, and for men increased from 11·5 years (11·3–11·7) in 2002 to 13·6 years (13·4–13·9) in 2019.  

Interpretation  

In the decade before the COVID-19 pandemic, life expectancy declined in increasing numbers of communities in England. To ensure that this trend does not continue or worsen, there is a need for pro-equity economic and social policies, and greater investment in public health and health care throughout the entire country.

Covid is killing rural Americans at twice the rate of people in urban areas

Via NBC News, a report by Lauren Weber of Kaiser Health News: Covid Is killing rural Americans at twice the rate of people in urban areas. Excerpt:

Rural Americans are dying of Covid at more than twice the rate of their urban counterparts — a divide that health experts say is likely to widen as access to medical care shrinks for a population that tends to be older, sicker, heavier, poorer and less vaccinated.  

While the initial surge of Covid-19 deaths skipped over much of rural America, where roughly 15 percent of Americans live, nonmetropolitan mortality rates quickly started to outpace those of metropolitan areas as the virus spread nationwide before vaccinations became available, according to data from the Rural Policy Research Institute.  

Since the pandemic began, about 1 in 434 rural Americans have died from Covid, compared with roughly 1 in 513 urban Americans, the institute’s data shows. And though vaccines have reduced overall Covid death rates since the winter peak, rural mortality rates are now more than double that of urban ones — and accelerating quickly.  

In rural northeastern Texas, Titus Regional Medical Center CEO Terry Scoggin is grappling with a 39 percent vaccination rate in his community. Eleven patients died of Covid in the first half of September at his hospital in Mount Pleasant, population 16,000. Typically, three or four nonhospice patients die there in a whole month.  

“We don’t see death like that,” Scoggin said. “You usually don’t see your friends and neighbors die.”

Part of the problem is that Covid incidence rates in September were roughly 54 percent higher in rural areas than elsewhere, said Fred Ullrich, a University of Iowa College of Public Health research analyst who co-wrote the institute’s report. He said the analysis compared the rates between nonmetropolitan, or rural, areas and metropolitan, or urban, areas. In 39 states, he added, rural counties had higher rates of Covid than their urban counterparts.  

“There is a national disconnect between perception and reality when it comes to Covid in rural America,” said Alan Morgan, head of the National Rural Health Association. “We’ve turned many rural communities into kill boxes. And there's no movement towards addressing what we're seeing in many of these communities, either among the public, or among governing officials.”  

Still, the high incidence of cases and low vaccination rates don’t fully capture why mortality rates are so much higher in rural areas than elsewhere. Academics and officials alike describe rural Americans’ greater rates of poor health and their limited options for medical care as a deadly combination. The pressures of the pandemic have compounded the problem by deepening staffing shortages at hospitals, creating a cycle of worsening access to care.  

It's the latest example of the deadly coronavirus wreaking more havoc in some communities than others. Covid has also killed Native American, Black or Hispanic people at disproportionately high rates.  

Vaccinations are the most effective way to prevent Covid infections from turning deadly. Roughly 41 percent of rural America was vaccinated as of Sept. 23, compared with about 53 percent of urban America, according to an analysis by The Daily Yonder, a newsroom covering rural America. Limited supplies and low access made shots hard to get in the far-flung regions at first, but officials and academics now blame vaccine hesitancy, misinformation and politics for the low vaccination rates.

How the US vaccine effort derailed and why we shouldn’t be surprised

Via The Guardian: How the US vaccine effort derailed and why we shouldn’t be surprise. Excerpt:

There are very specific, well-documented reasons that Americans are hesitant to take vaccines. They vary from the troubling way the medical system treats people of color, to vaccine misinformation campaigns overwhelmingly popular in conservative circles, to logistical challenges.  

But population health researchers, whose work considers how society as a whole is fairing, said low vaccine uptake may be looked at another way: as the predictable outcome of a campaign subject to entrenched social forces that have diminished American health and life expectancy since the 1980s.  

“When I look at this I do see a very familiar pattern,” said Dr Steven Woolf, a prominent population health researcher at Virginia Commonwealth University. “When Operation Warp Speed came out I thought I was just seeing a modern example of this old problem where the scientific community developed the vaccine at ‘warp speed,’ but the implementation system for getting it out into the community was inadequate”.  

Woolf calls this “breakthrough without follow-through”. In that light, the plodding vaccination campaign could be seen as one more aspect of the American “health disadvantage”.  

The phrase describes a paradox: the US houses among the most advanced medical and research centers in the world, but performs poorly in basic health metrics such as maternal mortality and infant mortality; accidental injury, death and disability; and chronic and infectious disease.

"So much of the whole issue of social determinants of health and the US ‘health disadvantage’ is rooted in a lack of trust and a lack of trustworthiness in many parts of our society,” said Laudan Y Aron, a senior fellow at the Urban Institute’s health policy center. 

A key piece of research in this area is a 2013 report by a panel chaired by Woolf, directed by Aron, and funded by the National Institutes of Health. Called US Health in International Perspective: Shorter Lives, Poorer Health, the report describes how Americans spend more than double per person on healthcare compared to 17 peer nations, but rank near the bottom in health outcomes.  

The phenomenon is described as “pervasive”, impacting all age groups up to 75, with life expectancy declining especially for women. In just a few examples, Americans have the highest infant mortality, children are less likely to live to age five, and the US has the worst rates of Aids among peer nations.  

The US also has the highest or among the highest rates of cardiovascular disease, obesity, chronic lung disease and disability. Together, these risk factors culminate in Americans having the worst or second worst probability of living to age 50.  

Americans know intuitively that their healthcare is expensive, frustrating and often unfair. Remarkably, even amid the pandemic, roughly 30 million Americans went without health insurance, exposing them to potentially ruinous medical debt.  

“It’s also really interesting how often the messaging is: talk to your doctor, talk to someone you trust,” said Aron. “Yet, we don’t really acknowledge how many people don’t have a doctor, or a doctor they have a trust-based relationship with them”.

New findings on pandemic kids. And what they really tell us

The Tyee has published my article: New Findings on Pandemic Kids. And What They Really Tell Us. Excerpt:

A new report by Children First Canada takes a long and detailed look at the state of our kids in this second year of pandemic. Even if you don’t have children, but hope for a decent and dignified old age, you’d better take note the findings of Raising Canada 2021 — and take appropriate action in this and future elections. 

The report finds that COVID-19 has aggravated ten major threats to our children. Those threats have been still more aggravated by “cross-cutting themes”: access to education and child care, access to health care and social services, inequity and inequality, and climate change. 

The report points to a host of threats to children that are also threats to us all. And those threats are unlikely to be blunted short of the kind of social transformation we usually call a revolution. 

Let’s look at the threats first. Some are simply intensified forms of the pre-pandemic status quo. Kids are coming into emergency departments with opioid and other poisonings, and cannabis ingestions. Their parents’ attempts to cope with stress don’t work with the kids either. 

Pre-pandemic Canada was stressful enough, but the report finds that “the effects of school closures have accelerated this threat,” leading to more eating disorders, substance misuse and suicide attempts among adolescents.

Systemic racism and discrimination stress racialized families, and the pandemic has only stressed them more. So it should be no surprise that “status First Nations, Métis, Inuit and Black children are disproportionately overrepresented in the child welfare system.” 

So stressed parents with no support are taking it out on their kids: “In some jurisdictions, clinicians have seen twice as many infants for maltreatment-related concerns, specifically fractures and head trauma.” 

More work for the health-care system 

Meanwhile, even less-stressed parents have skipped routine childhood vaccinations, ensuring more work for our health-care system when kids start coming down with measles and other preventable diseases. While many Canadian and U.S. states try to vaccinate their kids from age 12 and up, the report says, for those under 12 “vaccines may not be available until 2022.” Cuba is already testing its homegrown vaccines on kids as young as three. 

The pandemic has worsened childhood poverty, notably in a third of female lone-parent families, and “households with children are more likely to face food insecurity compared to households without children.” In other words, kids aren’t getting enough to eat. We are “ranked 37th out of 41 countries when it comes to providing healthy food for children.” Failing to nourish our children today will have consequences for the rest of the century. 

Well, not for those who die in infancy. The report says, “Canada’s infant mortality rate has increased. It is now the second highest among 17 OECD countries, at approximately 4.4 infant deaths per 1,000 live births. This is a marked change from 1960, when Canada ranked fifth lowest.”

Health inequality and COVID-19

Via the American Economic Association: Health inequality and COVID-19.

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a sense that everyone was equally vulnerable. Anyone could catch the deadly virus. Nevertheless, it has disproportionately affected less advantaged groups.   

In a paper in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, authors Marcella Alsan, Amitabh Chandra, and Kosali Simon document the initial health effects of COVID-19 in the United States and discuss the challenges of assessing its mortality toll. 

One measurement they analyzed was a calculation of “excess deaths,” or the difference between deaths observed in a particular time period and the deaths expected based on prior trends. 

Panel B of Figure 4 from Alsan et al. (2021)

Panel B of Figure 4 from the authors’ paper compares the excess mortality rates in 2020 of minorities to non-Hispanic Whites grouped by age range.       

The chart reveals that Black and Hispanic groups suffered from higher rates of death than White and Asian Americans in every age group.  

Black Americans as a whole experienced excess mortality of 2.14 deaths per 1,000 population—a 25 percent increase relative to trend, while Hispanic Americans saw excess mortality of 1.44 deaths per 1,000 population—a nearly 40 percent rise relative to trend.  

By comparison, non-Hispanic Whites and Asians experienced increases in mortality of 1.29 and 0.58 deaths per 1,000 population, respectively, which are both increases of less than 15 percent relative to trend. 

The panel also shows that the Black–White and Hispanic–White ratios are higher at younger ages compared to older groups. 

According to the researchers, alternative concepts, such as “years of potential life lost,” may do a better job at capturing the true costs of the pandemic for disadvantaged groups.

Taiwan reports widening income gap amid COVID-19 pandemic

Via FocusTaiwan.tw: Taiwan reports widening income gap amid COVID-19 pandemic.

Taipei, Aug. 22 (CNA) The COVID-19 pandemic had changed the lifestyles of people in Taiwan dramatically and has led to a sharp rise of income inequality, the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) said Sunday, citing 2020 data. 

Since COVID-19 was first confirmed to have spread to Taiwan in January last year, it has disrupted the country's manufacturing operations, hurt consumer confidence and dealt a blow to the service industry, the DGBAS said. 

While average household savings grew by a record annual 14.8 percent last year to NT$265,000 (US$9,461) since 1994, the income gap between rich and poor households widened, the DGBAS said, citing its 2020 Survey of Family Income and Expenditure. 

In 2020, income inequality in Taiwan was the highest in eight years, with the top 20 percent of households earning 6.13 times the bottom 20 percent, according to the DGBAS. 

Chu Tzer-ming (朱澤民), head of the DGBAS, attributed the sharp rise income inequality to the fact that disadvantaged employees have been hit harder by the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, as many of them have been asked to take unpaid leave, for example. 

Meanwhile, the DGBAS survey showed that average household spending in Taiwan fell by an annual 1.7 percent in 2020 to NT$815,000 (US$29,107), registering the biggest drop on record. 

Dachrahn Wu (吳大任), director of the Research Center for Taiwan's Economic Development at National Chengchi University, said the threat of new COVID-19 variants might take a toll on Taiwan's job market this year, dimming the prospects of a reduction of income inequality. 

The COVID-19 outbreak has ravaged Taiwan's economy more heavily this year than in 2020, when compensatory consumption surged in the second half of the year after the government eased some its disease prevention restrictions, he said. 

Taiwan's manufacturing capacity and exports, however, have grown sharply this year, bringing benefits to shareholders and employees of companies in the manufacturing and high tech sectors, he said. 

In comparison, employees in the service industry saw their earnings drop due to job loss or furloughs, as economic activity declined due to the COVID-19 outbreak, Wu said. 

The government should do more to provide relief to economically and socially disadvantaged people affected by the COVID-19 outbreak, Wu said, noting that property sales were brisk in the first half of 2021 and the domestic economy will grow robustly for the whole of the year.